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Scrutinising government practices

Data quality and
the law of refugee
protection in
Australia

Regina Jefferies

Qantas Airbus A330-303 (VH-QPF)
at Perth International Airport
(mailer_diablo/Wikimedia Commons)

Australia’s policies towards asylum seekers
who arrive in the country by air and seek
protection at or before ‘immigration clearance’1 at airports have been largely overshadowed by debates over offshore detention, processing, and interdiction policies.
Immigration clearance is a physical zone,
in these cases, at an airport, that every
passenger must pass through before being
allowed to enter Australia. Yet, even when
asylum seekers who arrive by plane do
receive Parliamentary or media attention, it
relates generally to the backlog of individuals who have successfully passed through
immigration clearance and subsequently
lodged an asylum application. 2 A glance at
data provided by the Department of Home
Affairs (‘DHA’) in Senate Estimates3 and other
contexts4 seems to suggest that the lack of
focus on travellers seeking protection at or
before immigration clearance at airports finds
at least some support in the smaller number
of individuals applying for protection at
Australian airports, relative to maritime arrivals.5 In October 2017, in response to a question by Senator Kim Carr, the Department of
Immigration and Border Protection (‘DIBP’)
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reported that only 10 people had arrived at
an international airport and claimed asylum
in the first three months of the financial year
in 2017 through 2018.6
However, a recent decision by the DHA
under the Freedom of Information Act 1982
(Cth) (‘FOI Act’) indicates that statistics previously provided to Parliament by the DIBP,
now part of the DHA, are likely deficient. On
6 February 2019, the DHA issued a decision
under the FOI refusing access to the ‘number
of individuals who have made protection
claims before, or at, immigration clearance
at airports since 2008’,7 because the agency
asserted that it did ‘not hold existing documents as falling in the scope of the request’.8
After conducting an internal review, the DHA
confirmed that:
referrals for persons seeking to engage
Australia’s protection claims are in fact
recorded in the relevant system under
one of two separate codes. One of these
codes is specific to Refugee Claims, the
other is for Manual Referrals/Reason
Unknown. A very low number of referrals
have been recorded under the code for
Refugee Claims and as there is no distinct
63

way of determining which of the Manual
Referrals may have related to protection claims, the total number of persons
raising protection claims at Australia’s
borders remains undetermined.9
In other words, although the DHA records
referrals for persons seeking protection at
Australian airports, poor data collection
practices mean that the ‘total number of
persons raising protection claims at Australia’s borders remains undetermined’.10
This article explores the legal compliance consequences of poor data quality
through an information systems lens. Data
quality can be defined as ‘fitness for use’11
and encompasses a variety of characteristics,12 including accuracy, completeness,
and currency.13 Data lacking any of these
dimensions can have a significant impact
on data quality. This article explores the
impact of the data quality dimension of
completeness in the context of the DHA’s
operations targeting asylum seekers who
arrive at Australian airports from abroad. The
piece begins by situating asylum seekers
within the border continuum and Protection
Visa legal and policy framework. The work
then describes aspects of the DHA’s current
data collection process and examines how
the current process fails to attain the data
quality characteristic of completeness.14 The
article concludes with an examination of the
legal consequences of poor data quality,
as well as a call for increased transparency
and accountability so that Parliament and
the Australian public may accurately judge
the DHA’s compliance with international and
domestic legal obligations.
i

Entry screening and the Department of
Home Affairs data collection practices

Australia has undertaken a number of international legal obligations in relation to refugees and asylum seekers by becoming party
to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967
Protocol.15 Foremost among those obligations is the fundamental obligation of non-refoulement, or the requirement not to return
an individual to a place where they might
be persecuted or subjected to other serious
harm.16 The domestic framework intended to
give effect to these obligations can be found
primarily within the Migration Act of 1958
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and, though Australia has formally removed
the obligation of non-refoulement from
consideration in the context of the removal of
‘unlawful non-citizens’,17 Australian policy still
recognises and seeks to implement the obligation for non-citizens seeking protection at
the airport.18 The framework includes, but is
not limited to, the creation of Protection Visas
and complementary protection for individuals to whom Australia owes protection obligations.19 The Australian approach to border
control constrains and significantly impacts
the protection framework, manifesting in a
complex, multi-agency effort of deterring
asylum seekers while insisting that those
in need of protection pursue a process of
refugee resettlement. The Australian Border
Force (‘ABF’), formed in 2015 by combining
the DIBP and the Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service (‘ACBPS’), sits at
the centre of the deterrence framework as
the operational enforcement arm of the DHA.
The ABF approaches the border as a ‘strategic national asset, a complex continuum that
encompasses the physical border, [] offshore
operations, and [] activities in Australian
maritime and air domains’. 20
A substantial legal and informational
framework sustains the border continuum,
beginning with the requirement to obtain a
visa for travel to Australia. 21 When an international traveller arrives at an Australian airport
with a valid visa, they must pass through
‘immigration clearance’ before being allowed
to enter Australia. 22 If the traveller seeks
protection at, or before passing through,
immigration clearance, they are referred to a
secondary immigration area for a review of
whether the purpose of their visa ‘aligns with
[their] intention for entry to Australia’. 23 Where
the ABF official finds that the individual has
come to Australia to seek asylum, rather than
for the purpose of their visa (eg work, study),
their visa may be cancelled and the immigration clearance is refused. 24 If the traveller
has been refused immigration clearance, the
ABF official conducts a second interview to
determine whether the individual should be
‘screened-in’ and allowed to lodge a Temporary Protection Visa application. 25 There is no
mechanism for judicial review of the screening decision, which means that an individual ‘screened-out’ faces rapid removal from
Australia, without regard to the non-refoulement obligation. 26
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Data quality

This section examines the DHA data collection processes, having regard to the data
quality dimension of completeness. 27 Data
completeness, or the ‘extent to which data
are of sufficient breadth, depth, and scope
for the task at hand’, depends upon the
contextual dimensions of the task. 28 In examining whether the DHA can be said to comply
with domestic and international legal obligations towards asylum seekers, the context
includes legal obligations which must inform
data collection. Where the data do not reflect
that context, data deficiencies may result. 29
According to the DHA:
The purpose of entry screening is to
determine whether a non-citizen should
remain in Australia, pending an assessment against Australia’s protection obligations, on account of the reasons the
non-citizen has presented for why they
cannot return to their home country or
country of usual residence.30

Second, ABF officials must evaluate
whether an individual’s reason for visiting
Australia aligns with the purpose of their visa
to determine whether the individual should be
‘immigration cleared.’37 Where an individual
seeks to enter Australia to apply for asylum,
their visa may be cancelled. Thus, the reason
for visa cancellation is highly relevant to a determination as to whether the individual was properly evaluated by the DHA for potential protection claims, as well as whether the individual
was given the opportunity to lodge an application for such protection. However, according to
the DHA, ‘[d]epartmental systems are unable to
aggregate data by reason for cancellation decision’.38 As a result, the DHA cannot accurately
track whether it is complying with the obligation
to provide an individual whose visa has been
cancelled at the airport with the opportunity to
lodge a protection application. In other words,
the data collected does not appropriately reflect
the context of the task of compliance with the
DHA’s legal obligations.
iii

Data may also be incomplete where values
are missing because the values were not
included, though they should have been specified.31 In the entry screening process, ABF
officials record data at several key intervals
— two of which are examined here. First, officials record an ‘inward movement and referral’32 for every traveller who claims protection
at an airport. Second, officials record whether
a visa has been cancelled in immigration
clearance.33 Information obtained through FOI
and provided by the DHA in Senate Estimates
reveals critical problems with both points of
collection regarding contextual dimensions of
the data and missing values.
First, in the Decision on Internal Review,
the DHA confirms that ‘referrals for [individuals]
seeking to engage Australia’s protection claims
are in fact recorded in the relevant system under
one of two separate codes. One of these codes
is specific to Refugee Claims, the other is for
Manual Referrals/Reason Unknown.’34 Yet,
protection claims may be recorded as a referral
under either code and ‘there is no distinct way
of determining which of the Manual Referrals
may have related to protection claims...’35 As
the data are likely missing values and cannot
be said to be complete, ‘the total number of
[individuals] raising protection claims at Australia’s borders remains undetermined.’36
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Transparency and accountability

Quality data are critical to administrative
policy formation, implementation, and legal
compliance. Poor data quality not only
‘compromises decision-making’,39 it ‘may
be the single biggest hindrance to developing sound strategy’.40 Since at least 2005,
the DHA, ABF, and predecessor agencies
have consistently failed to implement sound
record keeping and data quality practices.41
The department has repeatedly acknowledged these failures, stating in 2016 that:
These issues aren’t new and have been
highlighted in various reviews over the
last decade resulting in:
• Poor decision making and advice to
key stakeholders or for individuals;
• Failure to comply with legislative
requirements due to poor information
and records managements policies,
systems and practices; [and]
• Failure to deliver on strategic objectives and priorities (risk and crisis
management).42
These endemic problems have significant consequences, not only for questions
related to legal compliance,43 but for assessing whether the DHA has actually provided
accurate and complete information to Parlia65

ment and to the Australian public as part of
the democratic process. Without a complete
understanding of the number of individuals who have sought protection at Australian airports, or how many individuals have
had their visas cancelled due to raising a
protection claim – Australia cannot be said
to comply with its international and domestic
legal obligations. Failing this basic test not
only imperils vulnerable individuals in need of
international protection, it imperils the relationship between agency accountability and
Parliamentary oversight.
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